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Trade liberalization and the breakup of private carrier  services negotiations at the World Trade Organization.
agreements would lead to a reduction in average liner
This paper-a  product  of Trade,  Development Research Group-is  part of  a larger effort in the group  to assess the
implications of liberalizing trade in services. This research is supported in part by the U.K. Department  for International
Development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Please  contact  Lili  Tabada,  room  MC3-333,  telephone  202-473-6896,  fax  202-522-1159,  email  address
Itabada@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/
workingpapers.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  cfink@worldbank.org,  amattoo@worldbank.org,  or  ineagu
@worldbank.org. January 2001.  (33 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are  less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of  the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTrade  in International  Maritime  Services:
How Much  Does  Policy  Matter?
Carsten Fink, Aaditya Mattoo, and Ileana Cristina Neagu*
JEL Classification: F13, L41, L92
Keywords: Maritime transport, services trade policy, antitrust policy
Development  Research Group (DECRG),  The World  Bank, 1818 H Street,  NW, Washington,  DC 20433; Email:
cfink@worldbank.org,  amattoo@worldbank.org,  and ineagu@worldbank.org,  respectively. This paper is part of the
World Bank's research program on trade in services,  which is supported in part by the United Kingdom Department
of International Development. We would like to thank Marc Juhel and Alexander  Yeats for stimulating discussions;
Simon Evenett, Bernard Hoekman, Pierre Latrille, Marcelo Olarreaga, Isidro Soloaga, David Tarr, seminar
participants at the World Bank and two anonymous  referees for helpful comments.Non-technical Summary
Maritime transport costs significantly impede international  trade, and influence geographical
patterns of production and income. Even though improvements  in technology (notably
containerization)  have led to a significant decline in unit costs, there has not been a
commensurate decline in maritime transport costs. We focus on two explanatory factors:
restrictive trade policies of governments  and private anti-competitive  practices. The former
include a variety of cargo reservation schemes,  as well as the monopoly rights granted to
providers of port and auxiliary services, such as cargo handling. The latter include primarily, but
not exclusively, the rate fixing practices of maritime conferences, which enjoy an exemption
from competition rules in major traders, like the United States and European Union.
Until recently, paucity of data has precluded a rigorous empirical examination of the role of these
factors. An even greater barrier to empirical research has been the absence of comprehensive
information on public policies and private practices. Both constraints were relaxed recently. We
use a new database, created as part of the World Bank's Trade in Services Project, which
contains information on both policy and private rate-fixing  arrangements affecting maritime
trade with the United States.  The US Department of Transportation  recently published data on
waterborne transport charges, broken down for the first time by type of service-liner,  bulk and
tanker.
The econometric analysis presented in this paper confirms, first of all, the importance of all the
standard determinants of transport prices, ranging from distance to technology. More
interestingly, we find that both public policy and private practices exercise a significant influence
on maritime transport prices. Of public restrictions,  the cargo reservation policies which
proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s seem to be largely ineffectual, but the restrictions on the
provision of port services significantly  raise prices.  Most striking is the even more powerful
effect that private anti-competitive  practices have in keeping prices high.  While trade
liberalization would lead to an average reduction in transport prices by 9 percent and cost
savings of up to $850 million, the breakup of private carrier agreements  would cause prices to
decline further by 25 percent and additional cost savings of up to $2 billion on goods carried to
the US alone. The indirect benefits from the reduction in impediments  to trade are also likely to
be substantial.
This paper has clear implications for policy. The current round of WTO negotiations on maritime
transport, under the General Agreement on Trade in Services  (GATS), offers an opportunity not
only to negotiate away trade restrictions, but also to develop pro-competitive  rules. We propose
that the weak GATS provision dealing with business practices be strengthened through the
creation of two obligations. The first would require an end to the exemption of collusive
agreements in the maritime sector from national competition law. The second would create a
right for foreign consumers to challenge anti-competitive  practices by shipping lines in the
national courts of countries whose citizens own or control these shipping lines. The second
obligation is necessary to deal with the possibility of inadequate enforcement by public agencies,
and already has a precedent in the WTO rules on intellectual property and government
procurement.
2It may not be easy to create such rules. The previous GATS negotiations  saw attempts to
strengthen the relevant GATS provision thwarted by some of the countries that currently exempt
maritime conferences from their anti-trust laws. However, the reluctance of many countries to
make liberalization commitments under the GATS weakened the negotiating momentum. One
way forward in the current round of services  negotiations is for a coalition of countries to offer
substantial trade liberalization conditional  on the strengthening  of competition rules. By targeting
the twin maladies of maritime trade, this strategy could deliver considerable global benefits.
3I. Introduction
Maritime transport costs have a profound influence on international  trade. In some cases, their
trade-inhibiting  effect dwarfs that of customs duties.'  More generally, economic  research has
highlighted the role of transport costs in determining  geographical  patterns of trade, production,
industrial structure, and income. 2 Interesting new work even suggests that transport costs (as an
element of trade costs) help explain a variety of puzzles in the field of international
macroeconomics, such as the well-known  home biases in consumption and investment, and the
excessive volatility of exchange rates. 3 These observations  are interesting from a policy point of
view, however, only if something  can be done about these costs. Are transport costs
exogenously determined by technological  developments  or can they be influenced  by policy?
It has been argued that maritime transport costs are kept high by restrictive trade policies,
notably the cargo reservation schemes and monopoly rights granted to providers of port and
auxiliary services.4 It has also been argued that private anti-competitive  practices, primarily but
not exclusively of the maritime conferences, are responsible for keeping costs high. 5 However,
most observers also argue that both public and private trade-restrictive  policies are becoming less
and less important. 6 Yet the available evidence suggests  that transport costs, especially for liner
trade, are not falling-despite  dramatic improvements  in technology, especially in the form of
containerization (Hummel, 1999). Could it be that the disappearance of restrictions, like the
demise of Mark Twain, has been prematurely announced?
This paper seeks to assess the relative importance  of public and private trade-restrictive actions
in explaining the price of maritime transport services. To measure these prices, we used newly
published data on US waterborne transport from the United States Department of Transportation.
A major advantage with this data was that it is broken down by type of service-liner,  bulk and
' This has been demonstrated in several studies over the years. See Waters (1970), Finger and Yeats (1976),
Sampson and Yeats (1977), Conlon (1982), and Amjadi and Yeats (1995).
2 See, for instance, Venables and Limao (1999).
3 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
4 Bennathan  (1989), Amjadi and Yeats (1995), Francois et al. (1996), and Hummel (1999).
5 Francois and Wooton (1999), Hummel (1999).
6 White (1988), Franck and Bunel (1992), WTO (1998).
4tanker. It was more difficult to put together a comprehensive  data set on public policies and
private practices, a problem that has inhibited meaningful empirical research in this area.  The
few attempts to measure the restrictive impact of government  policies have only limited
coverage (McGuire et al., 2000) and there has not been, as far as we know, an attempt to use
existing information on carrier agreements. 7 This paper draws on a database, created as part of
the World Bank's services project, which contains information on both policy and private rate-
fixing arrangements  affecting maritime trade with the United States.
These data made it possible to carry out the econometric analysis  presented in this paper. Our
estimates confirm, first of all, the importance  of all the standard  determinants of transport prices,
ranging from distance to technology. More interestingly, we find that both public policy and
private practices continue to exercise a significant influence on maritime transport prices. And,
somewhat surprisingly, private anti-competitive  practices seem to have a stronger influence on
prices than public restrictions.
What are the implications for policy? The negotiations  on maritime transport were the only post-
Uruguay round services negotiations that completely failed. This failure implied an unfortunate
loss of political momentum for reform of domestic policies, and, less obviously, a lost
opportunity to develop pro-competitive  rules. To some extent, an effort was made to develop
rules that would ensure non-discriminatory  access to port services. 8 But these rules, concerned
primarily with ensuring market access, did little to protect consumers from the anti-competitive
practices of international cartels. An international initiative is needed, since these practices
cannot be adequately addressed only through national competition policy-given  the weak
enforcement capacity of small states. A further reason for developing a first-best international
response to these practices is to prevent recourse to an inferior national response: recall that the
cargo-sharing schemes imposed by many developing countries were primarily a response to the
7Kang  (2000) uses the policy indicators developed by McGuire et al. to estimate the impact of restrictive maritime
policies on bilateral shipping margins, defined as the ratio of CIF import values to FOB export values. This
approach suffers from well-known data problems (import and export values are not reported by the same statistical
entities) and by the undesirable property that shipping margins vary with unit values of shipped goods.  The
empirical approach adopted in the present paper addresses both of these problems.
8 In some respects, the approach to port services,  which can be seen as "essential facilities" often controlled by
"major" or monopoly suppliers, was analogous  to the approach to basic telecommunications  networks established in
the pro-competitive regulatory principles.
5perceived power of conferences. A possible way forward is to strengthen the provision of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services  (GATS), dealing with anticompetitive  business
practices to ensure that the gains from liberalization are not eroded by collusive pricing.
II. An overview of international maritime transport
Maritime transport services consist of three types of activities: international maritime transport
(freight and passengers), i.e. the actual transportation  service performed once the commodity is
on board of a ship in a country until the moment when the vessel reaches the destination port of a
different state; 9 maritime auxiliary services, i.e. any activities related to cargo manipulation in
ports and on ships;10  and port services, i.e. activities related solely to ship management in ports.1  I
In this paper, we use data pertaining to restrictions affecting each segment of the market.
Due to differences in commodity types as well as to technological improvements  in the shipping
industry (most importantly, containerization),  international  maritime freight transport has
developed specialized branches. Thus, liner shipping, meaning maritime transport of
commodities by regular lines that publish in advance their calls in different harbors, is distinct
from tramp shipping, which refers to transport performed irregularly, depending on momentary
demand. Typically, liner carriers  transport commodities  with a higher degree of industrial
processing using containers, while non-containerized  raw materials (crude and refined oil, iron
ore, grain, coal, bauxite), generically known as bulk, tend to be carried in tramp carriers.12
Tramp shipping is generally believed to be a fairly competitive market, mostly free from
restrictions (WTO, 1998). In contrast, liner shipping has traditionally  been subject both to
9  International transport as defined by GATS, excludes cabotage, which refers to transportation  of commodities
between ports of the same country.
° In the GATS classification, maritime auxiliary  services include maritime cargo handling, storage and
warehousing, customs clearance, container station  and depot, maritime agency, and maritime freight forwarding.
" In the GATS classification,  port services include pilotage, towing and tug assistance, provisioning, fuelling and
watering, garbage collecting and disposal, port captain's services, navigation aids, shore-based  operational services,
emergency repair facilities etc.
12 Bulk traffic is typically divided into two categories: tanker (including  crude oil and oil related products) and dry
bulk (including iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite, phosphates). Note that the distinction between liner and bulk is not
watertight. There exists a gray area which includes "break-bulk" (i.e. loose, non-containerized  cargo transported
using liners), general cargo (non-bulk commodities  transported on liners without using containers), or containerized
goods transported by tramp carriers.
6private cartel-like arrangements and government  restrictions. This paper concentrates on the
liner segment of the market.
I.1  Cargo reservation schemes
Over time, the most important category of barriers applied to international  maritime transport
have been various cargo reservation schemes. These require that part of the cargo carried in
trade with other states must be transported only by ships carrying the national-flag or interpreted
as national by other criteria. These policies have typically been justified by either security (self-
sufficiency in times of war) or economic  (infant industry) concerns.
Cargo reservation takes various forms. It can be imposed unilaterally, if ships flying national
flags are given the exclusive right to transport a specified share of the cargo passing through the
country's ports. An alternative form involves cargo sharing with trade partner countries on the
basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements.  Thus, governments  of two or more countries may
decide to distribute cargo arising from their common trade, so that each national-flag fleet  is
granted a significant share. Ships belonging to third countries are allowed access to a small
share, or, in some cases, no share at all.
A specific form of cargo reservation scheme is the UNCTAD Liner Code of Conduct or the 40-
40-20 rule. This legal instrument, which was adopted in 1974 and entered into force in 1983
through its ratification by more than 70 countries, was meant to counteract the anti-competitive
actions of liner conferences - which are cartel-like  arrangements,  described below. Since in
many cases, access of outside shipping companies to a liner conference used to be restricted, 13
governments  applying the Liner Code required these cartels to divide the cargo transported
according to the following rule: 40% for ships belonging to the exporting country, 40% for ships
belonging to the importing country, and 20% for ships belonging to other countries. These
restrictions were meant to encourage the development of the shipping industry of developing
countries.
13 Except for the United States, which banned closed conferences. Cargo sharing and shipping conferences
interacted over time, and in many cases authorities tailored their policies by taking into account the presence of
carrier agreemernts.  For example, Chile's cargo reservation mechanism,  before the liberalization of the last decades,
was designed such as to favor access of Chilean shipping companies into conferences and to restrain conference
pressures on non-affiliated carriers (Bennathan, 19890).
7It is generally believed that cargo reservation schemes  have declined in significance,  as more and
more countries have phased them out. A further indication of the reduced importance of cargo
sharing is the spread of "open registries" in many countries and the intensification  of the "de-
flagging" process, i.e. the transfer of ships to open registries to enable the ship owners to benefit
from more efficient cost conditions.1 4 The UNCTAD Liner Code, which was never applied on a
large scale, is even less visible today, being applied mostly on routes between West Africa and
Europe.'5 Nevertheless, the evidence we have obtained on policy suggests that countries ranging
from Benin to India still have in place reservation policies that at least nominally restrict the
scope for trade. We shall try and assess whether these policies matter.
11.2 Price-fixing and other cooperative  agreements
Maritime carriers enter various types of agreements, which help them enjoy advantages that arise
from cooperation on technical or commercial  matters. Far from being a recent phenomenon,
carriers' collusive habits are deeply rooted in the history of maritime transportation, and the first
shipping conferences, covering the routes between UK and Calcutta, date back to 1875.  By
joining carrier agreements, shipping companies  retain their juridical independence, but consent
to common practices with the other members regarding pricing, traffic distribution and/or vessel
capacity utilization. Examples of carrier agreements  that were recognized in US regulation by
the end of 1998 were conference agreements,  cooperative  working agreements,  joint services
agreements, pooling agreements,  space charter agreements, and transshipment agreements.
Conference agreements are made between two or more ocean common carriers, and provide for
the fixing of and adherence  to uniform tariff rates, conditions of service, etc. among them.'6
Conferences are the most widespread type of rate-binding  agreement. In the US, conferences are
required by law not to restrict the entry and exit of any shipping company. Therefore, shipping
conferences in the U.S. foreign trades are "open", while those covering other routes may be
14 WTO (1998)
15  In many countries, national shipping companies  which had access to the reserved share but did not possess
sufficient technical means for its transportation, used to sell their preferential right to cargo, a practice which were
resulted eventually in a higher transport cost.
16 Since conferences are a characteristic of liner shipping,  they are also referred to as liner conferences.
8closed to outside carriers." 7 Cooperative  working agreements  are defined in the US Shipping Act
of 1984 as agreements  which establish exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working
relationships, but which do not fall precisely within the arrangements  of any specifically defined
agreement. Only some of the carrier agreements  have a rate-binding  clause, i.e. they declare that
they engage in unique price setting for transport services  provided by all members.
The high incidence of Conferences and other types of carrier agreements  in maritime transport is
due to the fact that the United States, the European Union and many other countries exempt
shipping conferences from antitrust regulation-on  the ground that they provide price stability
and limit uncertainty regarding available tonnage.' 8 The exemption from antitrust law is
compounded by the Federal Maritime Commission's (FMC) role in helping police price-fixing
arrangements. The 1984 US Shipping Act required all ocean carriers to file their rates with the
FMC and publish their rate and schedule information. Secret discounting on filed rates was
considered illegal. The FMC was authorized  to ensure, through the imposition of fines, that the
filed rates were actually charged.' 9 However, conferences  were required to allow for
"independent  action", meaning that members could post a rate different from the conference rate,
provided they notified the conference in advance. While this provision created some flexibility,
there was probably limited incentive to make publicly pre-announced price cuts which were
likely to be matched by rivals.
In recent years, there has been an erosion in the power of conferences for two reasons. The first
is the entrance in the market of strong and efficient outside shipping companies. Containerization
and other technological progresses have made it possible for outsiders to supply the same
services as the conferences at lower costs to consumers. A second development is the change
regulations affecting international shipping, notably the United States' Ocean Shipping Reform
Act (OSRA) of 1998, amending the Shipping Act on 1984,  entered into force in May 1999.
While preserving the antitrust immunity of the rate-setting conference system, OSRA allows for
17 Recently,  the  European  Commission  claimed  that  steps  taken  by  the  Trans-Atlantic  Conference  Agreement
(TACA)  to comply  with  the  "open"  conference  obligations  of  US  law  had  constituted  an  abuse  of  their  dominant
position.  It was  alleged  TACA  offered  inducements  to certain  shipping  lines  to enter  the  transatlantic  trade  as
parties  to the  conference  rather  than  as  independents  (Levitt,  2000).
IS Francois  and  Wooton  (1999).
19 The  rationale  for  these  measures  was  ostensibly  to protect  small  shippers  from  being  disadvantaged  by  their
inability  to extract  discounts  from  shipping  companies.
9the confidentiality of key terms (prices are included in this category) in contracts between
shippers and carriers. This amendment is bound to create greater scope for price competition.
In response to these developments,  two types of arrangements  have begun to emerge. First,
shipping lines now sometimes enter "discussion agreements". These allow conference and non-
conference carriers serving a particular trade lane to discuss and share information  about rates,
costs, capacity, and service. The members may adopt voluntary rate, capacity, and service
guidelines. Another recent tendency is for shipping companies and conferences to enter more
wide-ranging organizations, such as consortia, alliances and global alliances. There are two
interesting questions, only the first of which we address in this paper: how much do the
traditional conferences still matter, and, even though these new arrangements  are different from
conferences from a juridical point of view, how different are they in actual behaviour?
Some recent events provide implicit evidence  of the continued influence of collusive practices.
While price-fixing by conferences is exempted from the scope of competition law, the extension
of collusion to other areas has provoked the wrath of European competition authorities. In 1998,
the European Commission (EC) fined the "Trans Atlantic Conference Agreement" (TACA) a
sum of $314 million. The EC concluded that the conference,  which controlled more than 60% of
the traffic crossing the Atlantic at the time, set prices not only for the ocean leg, but for inland
transportation by truck or train as well. 20 In May 2000, the EC imposed a penalty on fifteen liner
shipping companies that were members of the "Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges
Agreement" (FETTCSA)-an  agreement abandoned in 1994 following EC action.  The
companies controlled, altogether, 80% of the traffic between northern Europe and the Far East.
Again the target of action was not price-fixing  per se, but the FETTCSA members' collective
strategy of not offering discounts from published  fares. 21  Finally, reports in the maritime press
20 As reported by CNN, the event marked a new record for fines imposed by the European Commission  on a cartel.
This was the first time that any EU authority had assessed the compatibility of liner conference  practices with EU
competition law.
21 See "FETTCSA: Commission fines shipping lines for an illegal price agreement  on the Europe / Far East trade"
(DN: IP/00/486 ), available from the European Commission's Web-Page.
10also suggest that the limited reductions in transport costs, despite an increase in entry, are
attributable to the legal privileges granted to shipping company agreements. 22
11.3 Restrictions on port and auxiliary services
Both port and auxiliary services,  particularly cargo handling, have tended to be monopolized.
There are two aspects to the liberalization  of these services. One is to allow foreign ships
serving the domestic market non-discriminatory  access to such services. The second is to allow
foreign competition in the supply of the service itself. Some progress was made in the GATS in
ensuring access to and use of port services, and some progress also in allowing foreign entry into
the supply of auxiliary services.
Seaports are coordinated by public or, in fewer cases, private organizations called port
authorities.  Depending on the role assumed by these institutions, seaports can be classified into
different categories. First, there are landlord ports, in which the port authority owns and
manages port infrastructure, while private firms provide  the rest of port and maritimne  auxiliary
services; private firms are able to own superstructure,  and operate assets pertaining to
infrastructure  by concession or licensing (ex. Buenos Aires, Argentina). Then there are tool
ports, where the port authority owns both infra and superstructure,  but private firms provide
services by renting port assets, through concessions or licenses (ex. Antwerp, Belgium). Finally,
in service  ports, the port authority owns assets and supplies services by directly hiring
employees. It has been argued that the landlord  port is the most desirable category from the
efficiency point of view, since it allows private enterprise and market forces to play a role in the
supply of services, while preventing monopolization of essential assets by private firms. 23 With
this broad benchmark in mind, we shall seek to capture some of the restrictions in place on port
and auxiliary services.
22 See, for example, "Obstacles lie ahead", 1999 Year-end  Economic Review, Bangkok Post, 1999.
23 Trujillo and Nombela (1999).
11III. Econometric Model
In this section, we develop an econometric  model of liner transport prices for U.S. imports. Our
analysis focuses on the ocean leg of the journey, because the data available (described below) do
not directly capture the price of maritime auxiliary services and port services. 24 Nevertheless,
policy restrictions affecting the latter type of services are also included in the analysis. This is
because the restrictions are likely to have an adverse effect on the efficiency with which these
services are supplied to liners and hence push up the costs of liner services-for  example,
because of longer waiting or unloading times. 25
We do not formally derive our estimation  equation from a fully specified structural model of
competition or collusion among liner companies, but our approach can be best understood in
terms of a simple constant-elasticity  pricing formula. This pricing rule relates the U.S. dollar
price of shipping product k from foreign port i (which is located in country  I) to U.S. portj
(which is located in U.S. customs district J), Pjk, to the marginal cost for this service,
MC(i, j, k), and a markup term, CD(I,  J, k):
P,k =  y(I,  J, k) MC(i,  j, k) *  (1)
The markup term is a function of the elasticity of demand perceived by liner companies serving
the routes between country I and customs district J for product k.  The pricing formula in (1)
could, for example, be easily derived from a model of Cournot competition.
Taking natural logarithms of (1) yields:
P,jk  = q(I, J, k) + mc(i, j, k),  (2)
where lowercase letters now refer to natural logarithms of the respective variables.
24 More precisely,  the data reflect transport  charges incurred in bringing the merchandise  from alongside the carrier
at the port of export and placing it alongside  the carrier at the first US port of entry.
25 The possibility of measurement error provides a more mundane  reason for considering  the impact of restrictions
on the port and auxiliary services. Even though in principle the liner transport  prices do not include the prices of
these services, in practice such a clean truncation  may not have been possible. See below.
12Unfortunately, we do not have any direct information  on costs of maritime transport operations.
We therefore decompose the marginal cost term, mc(i, j, k),  as follows:
mCojk  =a.  +  k  +yTYk +Sdf  +qj  +  p CR, +  'PS, +  I  PS.  (3)
The first term, a.,  reflects an effect specific to each U.S. customs district. It captures
differences across customs districts in port services and other auxiliary services, such as cargo
handling, and has been included for the reasons noted above. The second variable, 2k, is a
product specific effect that captures differences in the physical properties of shipped goods, such
as weight or size.
The third effect is a technological effect represented by the share of goods shipped in containers,
T,vk. Since containerization is likely to reduce the marginal cost of liner services, we expect the
coefficient y to have a negative sign. Our fourth cost variable is the shipping distance between
foreign port i and the main port in customs district J, du.  There is some evidence that the effect
of shipping distance on transport cost becomes less important  for longer distances (Hummels,
1999), and so we expect 0 < a  < 1.  Fifth, we include an economies of scale effect represented by
the total value of U.S. imports carried by liners (including non-textiles goods) between foreign
port i and district J,  qij.  If there are economies of scale with regard to traffic originating from
the same port, we expect the coefficient q to be negative.
Finally, we add three policy indicators that capture restrictions maintained by Is  government
affecting the supply of maritime services by foreigners. These restrictions are expected to lead to
inefficiencies  and the employment of outdated technology. Specifically, CR, is a dummy that
indicates whether exporting countries maintain any form of cargo reservation policy for the
domestic  shipping  fleet affecting trade with the United States.  PS,  is an index that captures  the
existence of barriers to the foreign supply of cargo handling services, considered to be one of the
most important auxiliary services. PS2 is an index that measures the extent to which port
services (e.g., pilotage, towing, navigation aids) are mandatory for incoming ships. The extent to
which the use of such services is mandatory can be seen as reflecting the restrictiveness of the
port service regime. As noted above, the costs of auxiliary and port services are not directly
13captured by the maritime price data, but restrictions in both are relevant because they could push
up the costs of liner services.
The markup term, q(I, J, k),  is assumed to depend on the following four variables:
b(I,J,k) = Ak  +r CR 1 +yl AI +  AJ.  (4)
The first term, Pk , reflects a product-specific  effect that captures differences in transport
demand elasticities across sectors. Note that the transport demand elasticities are derived from
the final demand for product k in the United States. The second variable is again the variable
that captures the existence of cargo reservation policies, which directly limit the extent of
competition from foreign liners and thus may push up markups. The third and fourth effects, AIJ
and AIJ, are due to the existence of collusive agreements  among liner companies on routes
between country I and customs district J.  We distinguish between two kinds of collusive
agreements: price-fixing agreements (which include most conferences), and cooperative working
agreements that do not have a binding rate setting authority. A single agreement typically covers
routes between the ports of a foreign country and one or more US coastal districts that each
consist of several customs districts. Since collusion between liner companies is likely to push up
markups, we expect both coefficients sL and  2 to show a positive sign. But conference and
other price-fixing agreements are likely to be more powerful and to have a greater impact on
transport prices than cooperative working agreements,  i.e. we expect tV>  i 2.
Substituting (4) and (3) into (2), and inserting an error term enk, we obtain:
Pijk  = aJ  +,Bk+  y T,,k  +  a d,J  +  qj + yI/ A,, +  VI'A'  +  o CR] +,pI  PS+  p2  PS/2 +  k,  (5)
where fik  (4k +a  kY),  o  (p + r) and we expect the coefficients  on the three policy indicators,
w,  qo and  (  2, to have a positive sign. 26
26  Since we estimate both product fixed effects and customs district-specific  effects, we need to drop one dummy
variable (for one customs district) to avoid perfect colinearity  among the explanatory variables.
14We calculate the transport price, P,jk, as the share of liner transport charges in import values for
good k (at the 6 digit HS aggregation), multiplied by the unit value of imports. The U.S.
Department of Transportation defines transport charges as all freight, insurance and other
charges (excluding import duties) incurred in bringing the merchandise from alongside the
carrier at the port of export and placing it alongside the carrier at the first US port of entry. 27
However, actual data reported may include charges for port services and inland transportation. 28
To reduce the potential bias resulting from differences in inland transportation costs, we exclude
observations for which the origin of the import is different from the country of the port of
shipment (e.g., landlocked countries) as well as all in-transit shipments. 29 Additional
information on the construction and sources of all variables is provided in the data appendix.
Table I presents an overview of our estimation dataset. It covers all U.S. imports carried by
liners from the 59 countries for which we could find information on maritime policies. Data
refer to 1998. Liner imports account for around 65 percent of the total value of maritime
imports, the remaining 35 percent being carried by tramp services. 30 About half of all U.S.
imports (including all modes of transport-maritime,  air and road) are carried by liners.
IV. Econometric Estimates
Estimation methodology
We begin with an ordinary least squares estimation of equation (5) over the entire data set.  The
error term eUk  is assumed to be independently  distributed across exporting countries, but we
27 If insurance  costs  are  not  closely  correlated  with  transport  charges,  there  is the  possibility  that  our  transport  price
variable  is distorted.  However,  this  should  at least  partially  be remedied  by  the  inclusion  of  product  fixed  effects,  as
differences  in insurance  costs  are  likely  to be  greatest  across  products.
28 According to e-mail communication  with an official from the U.S. Department  of Transportation.
29 Note that we do not exclude the trade originating in third countries and in-transit traffic when calculating total
import values qij.
30 However, if we exclude U.S. oil imports (HS category 27) this share rises to 70% and liner transport becomes
relatively more important for developing countries.
15allow for interdependence among observations  within each country. 31  The results are presented
in Table 2.
While the coefficients  mostly accord with our expectations,  this empirical approach has a
weakness: it ignores competition from alternative  modes of transportation,  expressly tramp
maritime services  (bulk and tanker), air transport and road transport (in the case of Canada and
Mexico). For a number of product categories,  it is likely that shippers face an explicit trade-off
between the quality and cost of shipping a good by these alternative  modes of transport. One
approach to remedying this problem is to exclude all products for which competition from tramp
maritime and air services is important. Since it is difficult  to make a clean separation based on
product characteristics alone, we adopt a method relying on the revealed importance of the
alternative modes. Specifically, we exclude all observations  where either the share of air
transport as a percentage of total imports for shipping product k from country Ito  customs
district J is positive, or the share of tramp services  for a particular product k on all routes
between country I and district J exceeds 15 percent. This reduces our sample size from 250,237
to 98,997 observations. The estimation results with the reduced sample are presented in the first
column of Table 3.
Even though these results are in line with our expectations,  it is possible that the exclusion of
observations introduces a sample bias in our estimation. We therefore adopt a sample selection
model, where we estimate the likelihood  of a shipment  having no competition from air and tramp
services (as defined above) in two separate probit equations. The explanatory variables in these
probit equations are (the natural logarithms of) the unit value and the unit weight of shipments
and, in the case of air transport, a dummy variable that captures the existence of an open skies
agreement between country I and the United States. 32 We estimate this model using the
31Instead  of using a fixed effect specification  as in equation (5), we also estimated a model with random product
effects and maintaining the customs district fixed effects. This model yielded very similar estimation  results,
however. Moreover, the Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with
our regressors in the model, supporting  the use of fixed instead of random  product effects.
32 Since the unit weight is unavailable for selected shipments, the number of observations  in the probit regression is
somewhat smaller than in the full sample. In the case of tramp services, we also included country fixed effects,
except for Benin for which the share of tramp services  was below 15  percent for all observations. As in the liner
pricing regression, we assume that the error term in each probit equation is independently distributed across
exporting countries, but allow for interdependence  among observations  within each country.
16Heckman two-step estimation procedure, assuming that the error terms in the two probit
regressions are uncorrelated. 33 The results of the sample selection model are presented in the
second to fourth columns of Table 3. In the 'air' probit equation, the estimated coefficient on
unit value is significantly negative and the coefficient on unit weight is significantly positive,
suggesting that valuable and light products are more likely to be sent by air. By contrast, in the
'tramp' probit equation, the coefficient on unit value is significantly  positive and the coefficient
on unit weight is significantly  negative, indicating that tramp services are primarily used for
heavy commodities with low unit values. 34
In the final regression, we exclude Mexican and Canadian imports from our (already reduced)
sample. For these two countries, road transport is an alternative mode of transport that may
compete with maritime and air services. The estimation  results with both the simple reduced
sample and the sample selection approach are presented in Table 4, and are similar to those
presented in Table 3.
Estimates of the Model Coefficients
The results from the different estimating methods reveal a reassuring consistency. The estimated
coefficient on distance lies between 0.2 and 0.3, and is always significantly different from both
zero and one. This confirms that transport cost increase with distance, but less than
proportionately. As we expected, containerization, as measured by  Tvk, works to reduce liner
prices, the estimated coefficient being statistically  significant. The coefficient on the total value
of U.S. imports carried by liners, qj,, takes a small and significant  negative value.  This suggests
that there are economies of scales with regard to traffic originating  from the same port, and that
small countries or economies with small trading volumes may be relatively disadvantaged.
33 See  Maddala  (1983),  p. 282,  for a description  of this model. The assumption  that  the error  terrns  in  the two  probit
regressions  are uncorrelated  seems  warranted.  Decisions  on whether  to ship  goods  by air or by vessel  are likely  to
be independent  from decisions  on the mode  of maritime  transport.
34 It is worth  pointing  out  that  the explanatory  power  is higher  in the 'air' probit  regression  than  the 'tramp' probit
regression.  This  may  be due  to the fact  that  liner  and  tranp services  are not  good substitutes  and  that  the dominant
mode  of maritime  transport  depends  mostly  on product  specific  idiosyncrasies.
17Consider now the impact of restrictions on trade in maritime services. The most striking finding
is the strong positive impact on liner prices of the existence  of rate-binding conference and other
price-fixing agreements. The existence  of cooperative  working agreements  has a weaker impact
which is not always statistically  significant. These result confirms our expectation that price-
fixing agreements matter, and are more important than cooperative  working agreements.
The evidence on policy restrictions is mixed. The coefficient of the variable capturing the
existence of cargo reservation policies is close to zero and not statistically significant in any of
the regressions. This result gives credence to the claim that cargo reservation policies no longer
exert an important influence on liner trade. The estimated coefficient on the restrictiveness index
of cargo handling services is the only one that has a counter-intuitive  sign and is statistically
significant in the first set of estimates (Table 2), but with other, arguably more reliable methods
(Tables 3 and 4), it ceases to be significant. Recall that our dependent variable captures the cost
of complementary  services not explicitly but only to the extent that they feed through into the
ocean-leg liner prices. In this respect, the index on the restrictivenness  of port policy probably
has a stronger claim to significance. And our estimates confirm this - the coefficient is
consistently positive and statistically  significant. This result also seems in line with current
wisdom that the biggest policy hurdles to competitive  provision of shipping services are now to
be found at the ports rather than in the ocean leg. 35
Estimates of the Consequences  of Policy Changes
The estimated model can be used to calculate hypothetical reductions in transport prices due to
both the break up of private carrier agreements  and allowing greater competition in the provision
of port services. For this purpose, we take the estimated coefficients  from the sample selection
model in Table 3, which we consider to be the most reliable estimates-both  from an economic
and econometric standpoint. The simulated  price reductions are presented in Table 5. The
breakup of conference and other price-setting  agreements would lead to a more dramatic
reduction in transport  prices (34 percent) than the breakup of cooperative working agreements
35 Of course  savings  from  the liberalization  of port  services  are likely  to be greater  when  their  full impact  on
aggregate  maritime  transport  costs  is taken  into  account.
18(17 percent), whereas the liberalization of port services would cause a 37 percent drop in the
price of liner services.
If we compute the trade-weighted percentage reductions in transport prices across all
observations included in the sample selection model, the average total reduction would be 31.7
percent-made  up of the cumulative effects of the break up of carrier agreements (25 per cent)
and the liberalization of port services (9 percent). Total savings would sum to $656 million of
transport charges. To get a sense of the overall magnitudes involved, we can project these
savings to total U.S. imports carried by liners across all sectors and all routes. Our simulations
reveal that the removal of public restrictions to liner trade would lead to savings of up to $850
million dollars and the breakup of private cartels would bring about additional savings of up to
$2 billion. There are two important qualifications  to these estimates. First, the pattern of
restrictions in our limited sample may not be representative of the pattern of restrictions in trade
of all products across all routes. Second, competition from other modes of transport for some
products may limit the ability of carrier agreements to fix prices. But note that our simulation
pertains to the savings arising from goods carried to the United States alone. The imports of the
United States are only about a fifth of total world merchandise imports. So global gains from the
elimination of all forms of restriction are likely to be substantially  larger-particularly,  if we
take into account the indirect benefits from reducing impediments  to trade.
V. Conclusion
Our estimates confirmed the general belief that cargo reservations policies which proliferated in
the 1970s and 1980s are no longer an important barrier to trade. However, it emerged that both
public policy, specifically in the form of restrictions on the provision of port services, and private
practices continue to exercise a significant  influence on maritime transport prices. And,
interestingly, private anti-competitive  practices have a stronger influence on prices than public
restrictions.
These results challenge the notion that collusive carrier arrangements  have lost their significance
over the past decade. In defense,  maritime industry sources frequently point to the fact that liner
operators hardly break even and, on this basis, argue that there is little scope for price reductions.
But it is well-known that protection and cartel-like behavior in the presence of fixed costs can
19lead to inefficient entry and reduced profitability. The benefits of competition typically arise not
only from increased allocative efficiency, i.e. pricing close to costs, but also from increased
internal efficiency, i.e. a reduction in the costs. And there may be scope particularly for
increasing this latter type of efficiency in the maritime industry.
Our results need to be qualified. First, we have focussed only on routes leading to the United
States. While there is need for further research on other routes, the paucity of transport data in
other countries is a major constraint. Secondly, the analysis  here has focussed on solely the
maritime leg of the transport journey and not examined distortions on the inland leg. There is
evidence to suggest that the ocean leg accounts for a little more than a third of total door-to-door
shipping charges. 36 Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive  data on such charges. An
ambitious future research programme would seek to disaggregate  the components of door-to-
door shipping charges and subject them to an analysis similar to that carried out in this paper.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, this paper already has certain implications for policy. The
elimination of policy restrictions to trade in maritime transport services is likely to produce
substantial gains. Many of these restrictions can be removed unilaterally, and the GATS can be
used to bind the openness to reduce uncertainty and the possibility of policy reversals. But it is
not enough to eliminate  policy restrictions. There is also a need to deal with the private anti-
competitive practices of international  maritime cartels. Large states can probably tackle such
practices unilaterally through their own competition law, despite the extra-territoriality  problems
involved. But small states with limited enforcement  capacity are at a disadvantage,  and the
problem is accentuated by the fact that major trading countries have diluted the application of
competition disciplines to the maritime sector. One positive development described earlier is the
elimination by the United States of some of the provisions in its shipping law that helped to
police price-fixing arrangements  (see Section 11.2). Whether collusion can be sustained in the
absence of such facilitating devices is open to question. But we would argue that there is cause
for concern as long as the basic rate-setting conference  system continues to enjoy anti-trust
immunity.
36 OECD (1968) and Livingston (1986).
20An international  initiative would seem to be desirable. One approach would be to deal with the
problem by creating sector-specific  competition rules, as in the case of basic
telecommunications. Or, if such anti-competitive  practices  also affect other services sectors,
there may be a need to strengthen  the general GATS disciplines. Currently, Article IX of the
GATS, which deals with private anti-competitive  practices,  has little substance, providing only
for an exchange of information  and consultations.  The current round of services negotiations
offers an opportunity to strengthen this provision.
What form could such a strengthening  take?  We believe that the harnonization of either sector-
specific or general competition rules is probably neither feasible nor necessary. Our proposal is
much simpler and would involve the creation of two obligations. First, an end to the exemption
of collusive agreements  in the maritime sector from national competition law.  Secondly,  the
creation of a right of foreign consumers to challenge anti-competitive  practices by shipping lines
in the national courts of countries whose citizens own or control these shipping lines. The
second obligation is necessary to deal with a possible failure to enforce, and already has a
precedent in the WTO rules on intellectual  property and government procurement. 37
Would it be feasible to create such rules?  History does not provide cause for optimism. The
pro-competitive  rules in basic telecommunications,  in line with most WTO rules, were designed
to protect the market access rights of foreign suppliers, and their creation was supported by
conventional political economy forces. To put in place rules that enable small countries to
protect their consumers from foreign oligopolies will be far more difficult. In fact, the
negotiating history of the GATS reveals successful opposition  to the strengthening of Article IX
from some of the countries that exempt maritime conferences from the scope of their anti-trust
law. However, the reluctance of many developing countries to make liberalization commitments
under the GATS did not strengthen their case. One strategy in the current round of services
negotiations would be for a coalition of developing countries to put forward an offer of
substantial liberalization conditional on the strengthening of Article IX. Such a strategy, by
targeting the twin maladies of maritime trade, would provide substantial global benefits if
successful.
37 See  Mattoo  and  Subramanian  (1997)  for an elaboration  of this argument.
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24Data Appendix
Data on liner transport charges, import values, the  percentage of containerized cargo, total
imports carried by liners, and the market share of tramp services are from the Waterbome Trade
Database compiled by the U.S. Department  of Transportation. The containerization variable is
measured in terms of the weight of goods shipped. Tramp services are defined as bulk and
tanker services. Unit values, unit weights and the market share of air services are computed
from the U.S. Merchandise Imports Database published  by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
This source does not publish data separately by foreign and U.S. ports and we therefore have to
use these variables at the more aggregate level, i.e. U.S. trading partners and U.S. customs
districts.
Shipping distances were kindly provided from a private service called BP Marine. Some missing
ports that are included in the Waterbome  Transport Database had to be approximated  by the
closest neighboring port.  Information on private carrier agreements  between U.S. coastal
districts and individual countries comes from the Federal Maritime Commission (1998). We
excluded agreements signed before 1970 and also those with an unspecified regional coverage
(e.g., the Far East), as the defacto coverage of such agreements  may only relate to a few
particular routes. The potential bias introduced by this exercise is likely to be small, as most
routes covered by such regional agreements  are also covered by country-specific agreements. As
mentioned in the text, we construct two dummy variables to account for the presence of carrier
agreements on maritime routes. The first refers to conferences and other price-fixing agreements
and the second captures cooperative working agreements  that do not have a binding rate
authority. Data on the existence of opens skies agreements  were taken from the website of the
U.S. Department of Transportation.
The three indicators of trade restrictions are constructed based on information  compiled from the
following sources: WTO (1994), various WTO Trade Policy Reviews, GATS schedules of
commitments (available at http:H/gats-info.eu.intlindex.html),  APEC Individual Action Plan
submissions (available at http://www.apecsec.org),  unpublished OECD documents, ECLAC
(1999), EU Market Access Database (available at http://mkaccdb.eu.int),  and various editions of
the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers compiled by the United States
25Trade Representative (available at http:/www.ustr.gov). In some cases, data from the above
sources was kindly supplied by Greg McGuire. The cargo reservation dummy variable is
assigned a value of one if a country  has a bilateral agreement  involving cargo sharing with the
United States, if it is a signatory of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences
and applies Article 2 of the Code in its trade with the United States, or if it sustains any kind of
unilateral cargo reservation scheme, and zero otherwise. The cargo handling services index
measures restrictions or special requirements  imposed in a country to potential foreign suppliers
of cargo handling services (foreign suppliers means, in this case, locally registered companies
with foreign participation in their capital or branches of firms established in other countries).
The index values are 0, if there is no restriction,  0.25, if minor restrictions exist, 0.5, if a joint
venture condition is imposed, 0.75, if a very high national participation  in the capital of the
company is required, and 1, if foreign companies are not allowed to provide cargo handling
services at all. The index on mandatory  port services assigns a score of 0.125 for the existence
of each of the following mandatory services: pilotage, towing, tug assistance, navigation aids,
berthing, waste disposal, anchorage, and other mandatory services.
Table Al lists the countries for which we could find information  on the three policy indicators
and that are included in our estimation set. It also shows the assigned values of these policy
variables as well as the average value of the dumnmy  capturing the two types of collusive carrier
agreements (the latter lying between zero and one, if not all U.S. coastal districts are covered by
a particular agreement).
26Table  1:  Overview  of U.S. imports carried by liners in 1998
Share of Liner
Imports in Total  Share of Liner
Maritime  Imports in Total
Liner Transport  Liner Import  Imports (%)  Imports (%)
No. of  Charges  Value
countries  (million $)  (million $)  Total  Non-oila  Total  Non-oila
Developing  37  3,940  82,400  64.88  74.82  48.76  53.10
countries
Developed  22  3,080  104,500  64.20  66.24  50.73  51.23
countries
Total  59  7,020  186,900  64.71  70.04  50.13  52.38
Source.  U.S. Department of Transportation  and U.S. Bureau of Census.
a Excluding HS category 27
27Table 2:  Full sample fixed effects model
Dependent variable:
Liner transport prices  (1)
Distance  0.300**
(4.96)
Containerization  -0.072*  *
(-2.82)
Total liner imports  -0.016*
(-1.98)
Price-fixing agreements  0.514**
(5.76)
Cooperative agreements  0.042
(0.98)
Cargo reservation  -0.004
(-0.04)
Cargo handling services  -0.199*
(-2.25)
Mandatory port services  0.377**
(2.70)
Number of products  4,356
Number of observations  250,237
F-statistic  40.31 *  *
Adj. R-square  0.775
Notes: Fixed effect regressions assume independently  distributed  error term across exporting countries, but allow
for interdependence  among observations  within each country. t-statistics in parentheses. The F-statistic tests the
joint significance of all independent  variables (except the fixed effects).  ** and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
28Table 3:  Reduced sample and sample selection model
Sample selection model
Liner transport  prices  'Air' probit  'Tramp' probit  Liner transport prices
Distance  0.204**  0.231**
(4.60)  (5.42)
Containerization  -0. 134**  -0.1  16**
(-3.97)  (-3.05)
Total liner imports  -0.017*  -0.023**
(-2.35)  (-3.30)
Price-fixing agreements  0.464**  0.409**
(5.82)  (5.45)
Cooperative agreements  0.124*  0.190*
(2.49)  (2.42)
Cargo reservation  -0.051  -0.018
(-0.47)  (-0.16)
Cargo handling  services  -0.090  -0.059
(-0.89)  (-0.52)
Mandatory port services  0.320**  0.454**
(2.30)  (3.06)
Unit value  -0.385**  0.130**
(-18.44)  (13.12)
Unit weight  0.448**  -0.131**
(17.49)  (-11.52)
Open skies agreement  0.007
(0.07)
Sample selection  0.416**
correction (air)  (3.34)
Sample selection  -0.710*
correction (tramp)  (-2.34)
Number of products  4,214  4,208
Number of observations  98,997  250,159  250,159  98,815
F-statistic  33.16**  38.56**
Adj. R-squ.  0.779  0.783
Pseudo R-squ.  0.130  0.054
Notes: All regressions assume independently  distributed error term across exporting countries, but allow for
interdependence  among observations within each country. The sample selection corTection  variables are computed
following Heckman's two-step estimation  procedure. t-statistics (for liner price regressions) and z-statistics (for
probit regressions) in parentheses.  ** and * indicate statistical  significance at the I and 5 percent level, respectively.
The F-statistic tests the joint significance of all independent  variables (except the fixed effects).
29Table 4:  Reduced sample and sample model (without Mexico and Canada)
Sample selection model
Liner transport  prices  'Air' probit  'Tramp' probit  Liner transport prices
Distance  0.227**  0.223**
(4.24)  (5.07)
Containerization  -0.147*  *  -0.142**
(-4.57)  (-4.20)
Total liner imports  -0.015*  -0.022**
(-2.09)  (-3.14)
Price-fixing  agreements  0.488**  0.406**
(5.72)  (5.06)
Cooperative  agreements  0.116*  0.179*
(2.40)  (2.33)
Cargo  reservation  -0.035  -0.005
(-0.32)  (-0.04)
Cargo  handling  services  -0.098  -0.067
(-0.97)  (-0.59)
Mandatory  port services  0.313**  0.428**
(2.31)  (2.95)
Unit  value  -0.402**  0.131**
(-27.28)  (12.84)
Unit weight  0.469**  -0.132**
(27.56)  (-11.30)
Open  skies agreement  0.021
(0.22)
Sample  selection  0.480**
correction  (air)  (4.10)
Sample  selection  -0.673*
correction  (tramp)  (-2.23)
Number of products  4,190  4,184
Number of observations  97,676  247,673  247,673  97,518
F-statistic  31.79**  43.97**
Adj. R-square  0.781  0.784
Pseudo R-square  0.136  0.054
Notes:  All regressions assume independently  distributed  error term across exporting countries, but allow for
interdependence  among observations  within each country. The sample selection correction variables are computed
following Heckman's two-step estimation procedure. t-statistics (for liner price regressions) and z-statistics (for
probit regressions) in parentheses. *  * and *  indicate statistical  significance at the I and 5 percent level, respectively.
The F-statistic tests the joint significance of all independent  variables (except the fixed effects).
30Table 5:  Simulated reductions in transport prices
Cumulative
Breakup  of  effect  of the
co-operative  Breakup  of  breakup  of  Liberalization
working  price-fixing  private  carrier  of port  Cumulatdve
agreements  agreements  agreements  services  total effect
1. Percentage  reductions  on
restricted  routes  17.32  33.56  45.07  36.51  65.12
2. Trade-weighted
percentage  reductions  across
all observations  in our
dataset  6.73  19.89  25.04  8.97  31.70
3. Total  savings  across  all
observations  in our  dataset:
Absolute  value
(in million  $)  132  395  499  208  656
As a percent  of total
transport  charges  /a  5.29  15.73  20.05  8.27  26.37
4. Projected  total  savings
across  all exporting
countries  and all sectors  (in
million$) /b  544.1  1618.4  2063.0  850.4  2712.5
Notes: These  calculations  are based  on  the estimated  coefficients  of the sample  selection  model  in Table  3. Given
the functional  form of the regression  equation,  the individual  effects  do not sum  to the total  effect.
/a The share  of total  savings  in  total  transport  charges  is equivalent  to the unweighted  average  percentage  reductions
in  transport  prices.
/b The  projected  total  savings  in the last row  apply  the percentage  savings  in  total  transport  charges  estimated  for
the reduced  sample  to total  liner  transport  charges  for all U.S.  imports.
31Table Al:  Indicators of Maritime Policy  and Carrier Agreements
Cargo  Price-fixing  Cooperative
Cargo  handling  Mandatory  carrier  working
Country  reservation  services  port services  agreements  agreements
Argentina  0  0  0.13  0.00  1.00
Australia  0  0  0.13  1.00  1.00
Belgium  0  0  0.06  1.00  0.00
Benin  I  1  0.00  0.00  0.00
Brazil  1  0.5  0.75  0.00  1.00
Brunei  0  0  0.00  0.00  0.00
Canada  0  0  0.13  0.00  0.00
Chile  0  0  0.25  0.43  1.00
China  1  0.5  0.00  0.00  0.00
Colombia  0  0.5  0.13  0.50  1.00
Costa Rica  0  0  0.00  0.00  1.00
Cyprus  0  1  0.31  0.00  0.00
Denmark  0  0  0.06  1.00  0.00
Dominican Rep.  0  0.25  0.25  0.50  1.00
Ecuador  0  0  0.00  0.43  1.00
Egypt  1  0.75  0.75  0.00  0.00
El Salvador  0  0  0.00  0.00  1.00
Finland  0  0  0.25  0.00  0.00
France  0  0  0.38  1.00  0.00
Germany  0  0  0.38  1.00  0.00
Ghana  I  1  0.50  0.00  1.00
Greece  0  1  0.19  0.00  0.00
Hong Kong  0  0  0.25  0.00  0.00
Iceland  0  0  0.13  0.00  0.00
India  1  0  0.00  0.00  1.00
Indonesia  I  1  0.06  0.00  0.38
Ireland  0  0  0.13  1.00  0.00
Italy  0  0.25  0.50  0.38  0.00
Ivory Coast  0  0  0.25  0.00  1.00
Jamaica  0  0.5  0.00  0.00  0.60
Japan  0  0.75  0.13  0.89  1.00
Korea  0  0  0.38  0.00  0.00
Malaysia  0  0  0.25  0.00  0.38
Mauritius  0  1  0.38  0.00  0.00
Mexico  0  0.5  0.38  0.00  1.00
Morocco  1  0.5  0.13  0.00  0.00
Netherlands  0  0  0.50  1.00  0.00
New Zealand  0  0  0.38  1.00  1.00
Nicaragua  I  0  0.00  0.00  1.00
Nigeria  I  0  0.50  0.00  1.00
Papua New Guinea  0  0.5  0.00  0.00  0.00
Peru  0  0.5  0.00  0.50  1.00
Philippines  0  0.5  0.00  0.00  0.38
Poland  0  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.00
Portugal  0  0  0.13  1.00  0.00
Romania  0  0  0.63  0.00  0.00
Senegal  0  0  0.00  0.00  1.00
Singapore  0  1  0.38  0.00  0.33
Spain  0  0  0.06  1.00  0.00
Sweden  0  0  0.06  1.00  0.00
Taiwan  0  0.5  0.00  0.00  0.00
32Thailand  0  0.5  0.63  0.00  0.38
Togo  I  0  0.00  0.00  0.00
Tunisia  0  0.5  0.13  0.00  0.00
Turkey  0  0  0.00  0.43  0.00
United Kingdom  0  0  0.31  1.00  0.00
Uruguay  0  0  0.00  0.00  1.00
Venezuela  1  0  0.00  1.00  1.00
Vietnatn  0  0  0.00  0.00  0.50
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